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Bitcoin, the Commerce Clause, and Bayesian 
Stare Decisis 
F. E. Guerra-Pujol* 
In most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of 
law be settled than that it be settled right.
—Justice Louis Brandeis1
When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?
—Attributed to John Maynard Keynes2
INTRODUCTION 
In South Dakota v. Wayfair, the U.S. Supreme Court 
concluded that a state may compel out-of-state retailers to collect 
taxes on sales to its residents conducted via the Internet.3 Yet 
above and beyond retail sales, Wayfair also invites us to consider 
some novel constitutional questions. Does the Commerce Clause,4
for example, now authorize state and local governments to tax 
bitcoin transactions, criminalize the sale or use of sex robots, or 
ban self-driving cars?5
Broadly speaking, bitcoin, sex robots, and self-driving cars are 
specific examples of new technologies or new applications of existing 
technology—technologies and applications that were unimaginable 
when I was in law school6—such as blockchains or “distributed 
ledgers” (bitcoin), virtual reality (sex robots), and artificial 
 * Business law professor at the University of Central Florida. 
1 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
2 See QUOTE INVESTIGATOR, “When the Facts Change, I Change My Mind. 
What Do You Do, Sir?,” https://quoteinvestigator.com/2011/07/22/keynes-change-mind/  
[http://perma.cc/J93G-QPNG]. 
3 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100 (2018). 
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
5 I have chosen these particular examples because there is no direct federal legislation 
(as of this writing) in these areas. 
6 For the record, I attended law school in the early 1990s. 
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intelligence (autonomous vehicles).7 My thesis is that the 
development and deployment of these revolutionary Internet 
technologies and platforms will not only require us to reconsider the 
regulation of “commerce”; they will also invite us to reconsider the 
nature of precedent. In particular, why should the past trump 
change? In this age of technological change, why should stare decisis 
be our default rule? Moreover, because our existing principles of 
horizontal precedent are indeterminate, I will propose a new theory 
of horizontal precedent, which I call Bayesian stare decisis.8
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows: Part I 
briefly considers the taxation of bitcoin transactions to give the 
reader some sense of the constitutional Pandora’s box that Wayfair
just opened. Part II then delves into one aspect of the Wayfair
decision that has broad implications for the future. Specifically, 
when does technological change justify a departure from the 
Court’s previous Commerce Clause decisions? Part III sketches a 
possible solution to the problem of horizontal precedent. Part IV 
summarizes my proposal and concludes. 
I. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE: BITCOIN
The development of new Internet applications and 
technologies, such as bitcoin, sex robots, and self-driving cars, 
raise deep and difficult questions about the meaning of commerce 
and the wisdom of the Wayfair decision going forward. Given the 
lack of direct federal legislation in these domains, does the 
Commerce Clause (as per Wayfair) authorize state and local 
governments to tax bitcoin transactions, criminalize the sale or 
use of sex robots, or ban self-driving cars?  
For purposes of illustration, I will consider the taxation of 
bitcoin as an exemplar or paradigm case.9 In particular, given the 
holding in Wayfair, could a state now impose a sales tax on 
“blockchain” transactions or a property tax on cryptocurrency 
holdings? The answer to this conjecture will depend on how 
blockchains or “distributed ledgers” are classified for tax purposes.  
Nor is this an idle question. At the federal level, the Internal 
Revenue Service published a notice providing answers to 
7 For some recent literature exploring other dimensions of these new technologies, 
see ROBOT SEX: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 1 (John Danaher & Neil McArthur 
eds., 2017); HOD LIPSON & MELBA KURMAN, DRIVERLESS: INTELLIGENT CARS AND THE 
ROAD AHEAD viii (2018); see also PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN 
AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF CODE 3 (2018). 
8 See infra Part III. 
9 For an influential treatment of the use of exemplars in the domain of knowledge 
production, see 2 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 144–45 
(Otto Neurath et al. eds., 2d ed. 1970). 
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frequently asked questions on virtual currencies like bitcoin.10 In 
summary, the position of the IRS is that “[g]eneral tax principles 
applicable to property transactions apply to transactions using 
virtual currency.”11 Cryptocurrencies are thus treated as taxable 
property, just like shares of stock or physical assets.12
At the state level, the regulation of blockchains and 
cryptocurrencies is, as of this writing (summer of 2018), still an open 
question. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws approved a “Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency 
Businesses Act” in July 2017.13 Yet, state laws vary widely as to what 
goods and services are taxable.14 As a general rule, however, the sale 
of most tangible goods is taxable, while the provision of services and 
other intangibles is usually not taxable.15 But there are exceptions to 
the exception. Telecommunications services, for example, are subject 
to a tax similar to a sales tax in most states.16
Returning to my exemplar—the taxation of bitcoin by state 
and local governments—the answer to my conjecture will depend 
on how blockchains or “distributed ledgers” are classified for tax 
purposes. I, however, will leave that transcendental task to tax 
lawyers and the courts. Instead, I will now ask a deeper question. 
When should a court cling to its own precedents, and when should 
it disregard the past? It is this aspect of the Wayfair case that 
motivated me to write this Article. 
10 I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/8NU9-CDY2].  
11 Id. at 2. 
12 Id. 
13 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM REGULATION OF 
VIRTUAL CURRENCY BUSINESSES ACT (2017), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/regulati
on%20of%20virtual%20currencies/2017AM_URVCBA_AsApproved.pdf [http://perma.cc/7DGJ-
RL7A]. Although this model act has been introduced in three states (Connecticut, 
Hawaii, and Nebraska), as of August 2018 it has not been enacted by a single  
state. See Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Regulation%20of%20VirtualCurrency%20Business
es%20Act [http://perma.cc/2E6N-TAPB].  
14 See generally WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 841–43 (10th ed. 2014). 
15 See id. at 659. As explained by Walter Hellerstein: 
If a sale involves a transfer that is limited to tangible personal property (e.g., 
the typical purchase of goods at a retail store) or a transfer that is limited to 
services or intangibles (e.g., a haircut or a right to display an image), its 
taxability under a traditional retail sales tax is not in doubt. The former 
transaction will be taxable as a sale of tangible personal property; the latter 
transactions will be exempt as a sale of services or intangibles. 
Id.  
16 See, e.g., Gregory H. Wassall & John J. Sullivan, State Taxation of 
Telecommunications Companies, 79 PROC. OF THE ANN. CONF. ON TAX’N 342, 342 (1987).
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II. THE PROBLEMS WITH PRECEDENT
What is the primary purpose of precedent? Is it about 
promoting the rule of law?17 Is it about the creation of 
community-wide and intertemporal coherence?18 The protection 
of settled expectations and reliance interests?19 Or the laying 
down of general rules?20 In short, legal scholars and judges have 
articulated a wide variety of justifications for stare decisis. But 
as I shall argue below, Wayfair shows why these justifications 
are descriptively weak and normatively unpersuasive. Moreover, 
whatever theory of precedent you subscribe to,21 stare decisis 
poses an even deeper puzzle. Why should the past determine the 
future in the domain of law? After all, it is axiomatic that “one 
congress cannot bind a future congress” just as the decisions of 
one president do not bind a future a president.22 Why should the 
Judicial Branch be any different? 
Stare decisis is an example of path dependence, or the idea that 
the past matters.23 But from a normative perspective, it is not 
obvious whether path dependence in law is good or bad on balance. 
Some say that stare decisis for its own sake is a bad thing, or in the 
words of then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo, “when a rule, after it has 
been duly tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent 
with the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should be 
less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment.”24 Others 
take a more benign view of path dependence in law. Justice Louis 
17 See Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111
MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2012). 
18 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225, 227, 243, 251 (1986). 
19 See Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 EMORY L.J. 1459, 1459, 1506 (2013). 
20 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION 
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 174–75, 177, 181–82 (1991); see 
also Grant Lamond, Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning, THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 2.1 (2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/e
ntries/legal-reas-prec/ [http://perma.cc/TMT5-PSLB]. Cf. Larry Alexander, Constrained by 
Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 17–19 (1989) (describing “the rule model of precedent”). 
21 See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. 
22 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory 
Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 98–99 (2003). But see
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J.
1665, 1666 (2002). 
23 See generally S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and 
History, 11 J. L., ECON., & ORG. 205, 205 (1995). Cf. F. E. Guerra-Pujol, Puerto Rico as a 
Critical Locality: Is a Post-Colonial Puerto Rico Possible? A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the 
Impasse Over Puerto Rico's Status, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 561, 568–69 (2008) (applying the 
concept of path dependence to the debate over Puerto Rico’s constitutional status).
24 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150 (1921). For his 
part, Randy Kozel refers to this feature of stare decisis disparagingly as “unadorned path 
dependence.” Cf. Randy J. Kozel, The Rule of Law and the Perils of Precedent, 111 MICH.
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 37, 40 (2013) (“There is value in a citizen’s power to advocate 
her interests before governmental bodies and to receive an explanation for defeat that is 
more satisfying than unadorned path-dependence.”). 
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Brandeis, for example, famously asserted that “[s]tare decisis is 
usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more 
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be 
settled right.”25 Or in the words of Richard Posner, “The reason for 
path dependence in law is . . . the cost of adapting to a sudden 
change in law by changing practices adopted in reliance on the law 
before it changed.”26
At the same time, judging is supposed to be a species of 
critical thinking and practical reason, but to the extent that 
horizontal precedent privileges the past, stare decisis tends to 
foreclose the use of reason.27 But why? Why should law be 
immune to reason? For as John Maynard Keynes is reported to 
have said, “When the facts change, I change my mind. What do 
you do, sir?”28 In short, how should someone committed to stare 
decisis respond to Keynes’s query?  
A. Competing Visions of Stare Decisis in Wayfair
In South Dakota v. Wayfair,29 the Court concluded that a 
state may require an out-of-state seller with no physical presence 
in the state to collect and remit sales taxes on goods the seller 
ships to consumers in the state. To reach this result, however, 
the Court overturned two long-standing Commerce Clause 
precedents: National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue30
and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.31 In reality, direct departures 
from stare decisis by the Supreme Court are exceedingly rare, for 
the Court has overturned a previous decision only a handful of 
25 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
26 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 561 (6th ed. 2003). 
27 See, e.g., RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 50 
(2017) (“[T]he deferring judge might find herself compelled to ignore the lessons of 
experience in order to keep faith with the past.”). Cf. NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND 
AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 2–3 (2008) (distinguishing between decision-making based on 
experience and decision-making based on precedent). 
28 See, e.g., Wei Li, Changing One’s Mind When the Facts Change: Incentives of Experts 
and the Design of Reporting Protocols, 74 REV. ECON. STUD. 1175, 1175 (2007); Luigi L. 
Pasinetti, The Cambridge School of Keynesian Economics, 29 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 837, 841 
(2005). As an aside, although this quotation is often attributed to Keynes in the literature, 
its provenance is contested. The genesis of the structure of this formulation (i.e. “when x
changes, I change my mind,” where x is “the facts” or “information”) may, in fact, be Paul 
Samuelson, not Keynes. See QUOTE INVESTIGATOR, supra note 2. 
29 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2094 (2018). 
30 386 U.S. 753, 759–60 (1967), overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. 
Ct. 2080 (2018). 
31 504 U.S. 298, 317 (1992), overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 
2080 (2018). Quill, decided by a margin of 8 to 1, could be likened to a “super precedent.” 
See Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1205 (2006). See
Wayfair 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (overruling Quill and Bellas Hess).
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times.32 Nevertheless, although Wayfair is the exception to the stare 
decisis rule, I will focus on a deeper jurisprudential question posed 
by Wayfair in the remainder of this paper: How constraining should 
stare decisis be? For above and beyond the Court’s contested 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause,33 Wayfair also poses a 
perennial jurisprudential puzzle: The tension between stability and 
change. Or to borrow Justice Brandeis’s classic formulation of the 
problem, is it more important for the law to be settled or for the law 
to be right?34 In short, what is the probability that Wayfair itself 
will be overturned in some future case, especially in light of the new 
Internet applications and technologies that we surveyed above? 
But before outlining the competing visions of precedent in 
Wayfair, let’s restate the facts of the case.35 In 2016, South 
Dakota enacted a sales tax law declaring a state of emergency.36
The bottom line, so to speak, was that South Dakota was not 
collecting enough tax revenue. The law thus required some 
out-of-state sellers to collect South Dakota’s sales tax on all goods 
shipped into South Dakota.37 The problem with the South Dakota 
statute, however, is that it effectively overruled two previous 
U.S. Supreme Court cases, Bellas Hess and Quill.38 These 
precedent cases imposed a bright-line limit on the interstate 
collection of sales taxes: A state may not require an out-of-state 
seller to collect the state’s sales taxes if the business lacks a 
physical presence in the state.39 But the problem with this 
physical presence rule, in turn, is that a state must rely on its 
32 By way of example, Professor Jonathan Adler recently measured the frequency 
with which the Supreme Court overturns its prior precedents. According to Professor 
Adler, in the previous thirteen years (i.e., since John Roberts was appointed Chief Justice 
of the U.S. Supreme Court), during which the Court has decided close to 1000 cases, it has 
overruled eighteen of its previous decisions. Jonathan H. Adler, The Stare Decisis Court?,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 8, 2018), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/07/08/the-stare-decisis-
court [http://perma.cc/B5WT-2MUB]. 
33 Cf. David F. Forte, Commerce, Commerce, Everywhere: The Uses and Abuses of 
the Commerce Clause, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.heritage.org/the-
constitution/report/commerce-commerce-everywhere-the-uses-and-abuses-the-commerce-
clause [http://perma.cc/PNU2-24A3] (“No clause in the 1787 Constitution has been more 
disputed, and it has generated more cases than any other.”). 
34 See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more 
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”). 
35 If the reader is already familiar with the facts and the main issues in Wayfair, feel 
free to skip this and the following paragraph. 
36 S. 106, 2016 Leg. Assemb., 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016).  
37 Id. Despite the South Dakota legislature’s self-serving state-of-emergency declaration, 
the statute exempted out-of-state sellers who deliver less than $100,000 of goods into the state 
per annum or who engage in less than 200 separate transactions for the delivery of goods into 
the state per annum. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2018). 
38 See S. 106, 2016 Leg. Assemb., 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016). 
39 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2091. 
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residents to pay the sales tax owed on their purchases from 
out-of-state sellers, and consumers don’t like paying taxes!40
A legal duel then ensued when Wayfair, along with two other 
major online retailers (Overstock and Newegg), decided to challenge 
the South Dakota statute in court.41 Since none of these business 
firms had a physical presence in South Dakota, the lower courts 
followed precedent and ruled in their favor.42 So far, so good. But 
South Dakota officials rolled the dice and appealed all the way up to 
the U.S. Supreme Court, and their gamble paid off. Five Justices 
(a bare majority) voted to overrule their Court’s previous 
precedents.43 Thus, beyond the Commerce Clause question, Wayfair
poses a deeper question about stare decisis. To be clear, this deeper 
question was not about the scope of the Quill precedent but rather 
about its strength. Specifically, when is a court justified in 
overturning its own precedents?  
In particular, Wayfair poses the problem of horizontal 
precedent, the obligation of a court to follow the decisions by the 
same court in previous cases.44 Accordingly, this paper will put 
aside the practice of vertical precedent, or the obligation of a 
lower court to obey the decisions of a court above it in the judicial 
hierarchy.45 It is one thing for a lower court to follow the chain 
of command, but why should the highest court of a legal 
jurisdiction, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, be bound by its 
own previous decisions? 
The Wayfair Court split 5 to 4 on the question of stare 
decisis.46 Consider first the majority opinion by Justice Kennedy. 
In justifying the Court’s decision to depart from stare decisis, the 
majority opinion emphasizes the changes that have occurred 
since the precedent cases were decided: 
[T]he real world implementation of Commerce Clause doctrines now 
makes it manifest that the physical presence rule as defined by Quill 
must give way to the “far-reaching systemic and structural changes in 
the economy” and “many other societal dimensions” caused by the 
Cyber Age. Though Quill was wrong on its own terms when it was 
40 Or in the words of the Wayfair court: “consumer compliance rates are notoriously 
low.” Id. at 2088 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-114, REPORT TO 
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: SALES TAXES, STATES COULD GAIN REVENUE FROM EXPANDED 
AUTHORITY, BUT BUSINESSES ARE LIKELY TO EXPERIENCE COMPLIANCE COSTS 5 (2017)). 
41 Id. at 2089. 
42 Id.
43 Id. at 2087. 
44 IAN MCLEOD, LEGAL METHOD 153–59 (2d. ed. 1996). 
45 Id.
46 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087. 
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decided in 1992, since then the Internet revolution has made its 
earlier error all the more egregious and harmful.47
In other words, a precedent must give way when the conditions that 
produced that precedent have changed. When the facts change, so 
should the law.  
By contrast, the dissent emphasizes the disruption and 
transition costs that will follow from the Court’s decision to overturn 
its precedents: 
I agree that Bellas Hess was wrongly decided, for many of the reasons 
given by the Court. The Court argues in favor of overturning that 
decision because the “Internet’s prevalence and power have changed 
the dynamics of the national economy.” But that is the very reason I 
oppose discarding the physical-presence rule. E-commerce has grown 
into a significant and vibrant part of our national economy against the 
backdrop of established rules, including the physical-presence rule. 
Any alteration to those rules with the potential to disrupt the 
development of such a critical segment of the economy should be 
undertaken by Congress. The Court should not act on this important 
question of current economic policy, solely to expiate a mistake it 
made over 50 years ago.48
Simply put, it is more important that the law be settled than 
right. Error is costly, but so too is change. Wayfair thus presents 
competing visions of the strength of stare decisis. It is thus the 
perfect case to test our intuitions and theories of stare decisis. 
B. The Stare Decisis Swamp 
Wayfair shows there are different ways of drawing the line 
between stability and change. Many judges, following the lead of 
Judge Cardozo, would draw the line on pragmatic or consequentialist 
grounds, or in the eloquent words of Judge Cardozo: “when a rule, 
after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be 
inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there 
should be less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment.”49
The problem with such prudential or pragmatic justifications, 
however, is that there are also many prudential and pragmatic 
reasons for respecting precedent, even flawed precedent.50 Judges 
have identified a plethora of reasons for deferring to a previous 
decision, even when there is a consensus that the prior case was 
wrongly decided.51 These reasons include the promotion of judicial 
47 Id. at 2097 (internal citation omitted). 
48 Id. at 2101 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
49 CARDOZO, supra note 24, at 150. 
50 See, e.g., KOZEL, supra note 27, at 36–42, 46–48. 
51 Id. at 36–49.  
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efficiency, the advancement of collective wisdom, the furtherance 
of uniformity and common ground, and the protection of reliance 
interests.52 Of these justifications for stare decisis, reliance is the 
most important, so I begin there. 
The relationship between precedent and reliance is a close 
one: Once a court decides a question of law, various actors may 
take the court’s decision into account, modifying their behavior in 
light of the court’s previous decision. It would thus be unfair for a 
court to upset the settled expectations of parties who have relied 
on that court’s own past decisions to organize their affairs.53
These reliance interests are especially salient in a commercial 
context, such as entering into a contract or setting up a business. 
Although the protection of reliance interests is one of the 
most prevalent justifications for deference to precedent,54 it turns 
out that this justification is flimsy and unpersuasive. In 
particular, there are several problems with the reliance 
argument. One is the problem of multiple stakeholders. Another 
is that reliance is misplaced when conditions have changed. Yet 
another is the problem of abusive or unreasonable expectations. 
I will explore each of these problems below.  
The main problem with the reliance theory of precedent is the 
problem of multiple stakeholders. In brief, any given precedent will 
have multiple stakeholders, and these various stakeholders may 
have varying reliance interests and competing expectations about 
the soundness of a precedent and about the transition costs of 
overturning a precedent. Furthermore, Wayfair itself provides a 
textbook illustration of these problems with the reliance theory of 
precedent. In Wayfair, the competing stakeholders were the States, 
who wanted to collect additional tax revenues, and Internet retailers 
like Wayfair and Overstock, who wanted to avoid the burdens of 
direct taxation in states where they had no physical presence.55
But even if there were a single stakeholder (as opposed to 
multiple stakeholders), or even if the multiple stakeholders shared 
the exact same reliance interests, the reliance theory of precedent 
would still be unsound for two additional reasons. One is the 
possibility of misplaced reliance. The other is the possibility of 
abusive or strategic reliance. 
52 See generally Campbell H. Black, The Principle of Stare Decisis, 34 AM. L. REG.
(1852–1891) 745 (1886). 
53 See, e.g., Walter v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 673, (“The doctrine [of stare decisis] exists 
for the purpose of introducing certainty and stability into the law and protecting the 
expectations of individuals and institutions that have acted in reliance on existing rules.”). 
54 Kozel, supra note 19, at 1459. 
55 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089. 
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Reliance might be “misplaced,” especially when the 
economic or social conditions on which a previous decision was 
based have changed, or in the words of Judge Richard Posner, 
“[w]e would . . . expect, and we find, that stare decisis is less 
rigidly adhered to the more rapidly the society is changing.”56
Namely, the possibility of a Wayfair-like decision—of a precedent 
case being overturned due to changing condition—is thus a 
known risk of litigation. In the words of Judge Cardozo, this is “a 
fair risk of the game of life, not different in degree from the risk 
of any other misconception of right or duty.”57
That is to say, there are no absolutes in life, even in the domain 
of precedent. Specifically, even when the Supreme Court is paying 
lip service to the doctrine of stare decisis, it has consistently stated 
that all precedents are subject to revision. Since courts have the 
discretion to overrule their previous decisions, one could argue 
“reliance on a flawed precedent should be treated as a calculated 
risk.”58 On this view, reliance on a court’s decision, knowing full 
well that precedents can be overturned, is like placing a bet. This 
probabilistic view of precedent, in turn, poses a new question: How 
should these probabilities be calculated? 
The other reason why reliance is a weak argument is the 
problem of abusive or unreasonable expectations. Once again, the 
Wayfair case provides a textbook illustration of this problem. 
Although the Court acknowledges that “[r]eliance interests are a 
legitimate consideration when the Court weighs adherence to an 
earlier but flawed precedent,” it also suggests that some of the 
reliance on Quill was improperly motivated.59 In particular, some 
Internet retailers were hoping to gain an unfair advantage over 
firms with a physical presence in a taxing jurisdiction. According 
to the Court, “[s]ome remote retailers go so far as to advertise 
sales as tax free.”60 The Court denigrates the reliance of 
out-of-state Internet retailers thus: “[A] business ‘is in no 
position to found a constitutional right . . . on the practical 
opportunities for tax avoidance.’”61
But this line of reasoning in the Wayfair Court’s majority 
opinion poses a new problem: How does one distinguish between 
legitimate expectations (those that deserve to be protected) and 
undeserving or unscrupulous ones? What if only “some” parties 
56 POSNER, supra note 26, at 560. 
57 CARDOZO, supra note 24, at 148. 
58 KOZEL, supra note 27, at 48. 
59 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2098 (2018). 
60 Id.
61 Id. at 2086 (quoting Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 366 (1941)). 
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have such unreasonable expectations? Where should a court 
draw the line?  
Aside from reliance, another justification for stare decisis is 
that it promotes the “rule of law.”62 But as Professor Randy Kozel 
has shown, this justification is far from obvious, since the 
“rule-of-law benefits of stare decisis are invariably accompanied 
by rule-of-law costs.”63 One could even argue that the doctrine of 
stare decisis does more harm than good to the rule of law.64 How 
does stare decisis harm the rule of law? By privileging stability 
over accuracy and thus obstructing the use of reason. Judges who 
follow precedent don’t ask, what is the best way of deciding this 
case? Instead, stare decisis requires judges to ask a different 
question: Have we decided this question before? But there is no 
necessary logical relation between the timing of a decision and its 
accuracy.65 In short, the doctrine of stare decisis not only makes 
it more difficult to overturn a flawed precedent; it also hinders 
the use of reason. 
For its part, Wayfair is a textbook illustration of this 
anti-stare-decisis argument: “If it becomes apparent that the 
Court’s Commerce Clause decisions prohibit the States from 
exercising their lawful sovereign powers in our federal system, 
the Court should be vigilant in correcting the error.”66 In other 
words, courts should fix their mistakes instead of abiding by and 
perpetuating them, especially in cases involving constitutional 
interpretation. Or in the words of the late Justice Antonin Scalia, 
“[t]he whole function of [stare decisis] is to make us say that 
what is false under proper analysis must nonetheless be held to 
be true . . . .”67 According to Justice Scalia, his oath as a Justice 
was to support and defend the Constitution, not to support and 
defend his predecessors’ interpretations of the Constitution.68
Another justification for stare decisis is predictability or 
stability. Even a champion of the pragmatic view like Judge 
Cardozo concedes “[t]he situation would . . . be intolerable if the 
weekly changes in the composition of the court were accompanied 
62 See Waldron, supra note 17, at 3–4. As an aside, “rule of law” can mean different 
things to different people. By “rule of law,” I mean the idea that every person—including 
lawmakers and judges—must obey the law. 
63 Kozel, supra note 24, at 38. 
64 Id. at 41 (“Deferring to precedent can generate rule-of-law costs that may offset 
the countervailing benefits.”). 
65 See, e.g., Arbora Resulaj et al., Changes of Mind in Decision-Making, 461 NATURE 
263, 263 (2009). 
66 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2096. 
67 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 139 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
68 See id. 
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by changes in its rulings.”69 By way of example, Quill was 
decided by a vote of 8 to 1, while Wayfair was decided by a 5 to 4 
vote. But at the same time, only two Justices who participated in 
the precedent case (Quill) also took part in the subsequent case 
(Wayfair).70 Although a generational span of over twenty-five 
years separates both decisions, one is tempted to believe that the 
replacement of the other seven Justices with new ones during 
this span of time played a significant role in the outcome of the 
subsequent case.71
Yet another justification for the rule of stare decisis is judicial 
efficiency. Even a pragmatist like Judge Cardozo concedes: “the 
labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if 
every past decision could be reopened in every case . . . .”72 This 
concern (judicial efficiency) is especially salient in Commerce 
Clause cases, since most legislation has some connection, however 
tenuous, to commerce and since so much local legislation is 
protectionist in nature.73 If ever there were an area of law where 
stability mattered more than getting it right, it would be the 
Commerce Clause. But why should efficiency trump accuracy?  
In short, the arguments in favor of precedent turn out to 
be rather flimsy and unpersuasive. In truth, stare decisis is an 
indeterminate doctrine. 
C. The Bottom Line: Horizontal Precedent is Indeterminate  
Stare decisis is an indeterminate doctrine because it is easy to 
find a reason for overruling a previous precedent when the 
precedent case is wrong. True, when a previous case is deemed to 
be wrongly decided, judges are supposed to apply precedent unless 
there is a good reason or special justification for overruling it.74
But the problem with this test is that it is not very demanding. 
69 CARDOZO, supra note 24, at 150. 
70 Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas were the only Justices who participated 
in both decisions. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); Wayfair, 138 S. 
Ct. at 2080. 
71 The careful reader will notice that I hedged my previous statement with the words 
“tempted to believe.” I did this because, in fact, both Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas 
changed their minds regarding the correctness of Quill and ended up voting to overturn 
their Court’s own precedent. That is, they both thought in good faith that the error in 
Quill was sufficiently egregious to justify overturning it. Cf. CARDOZO, supra note 24, at 
158 (“The United States Supreme Court and the highest courts of the several states 
overrule their own prior decisions when manifestly erroneous.”). 
72 CARDOZO, supra note 24, at 149. 
73 See, e.g., Wendy E. Takacs, Pressures for Protectionism: An Empirical Analysis 19 
ECON. INQUIRY 687, 691–92 (1981). 
74 Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (“[A] decision 
to overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case 
was wrongly decided.”). 
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How hard can it be for a creative or motivated judge to find a 
“special reason” when he needs one? Wayfair itself is a textbook 
illustration of this problem. 
In Wayfair that “special reason” was the unfairness of the 
physical presence rule. Specifically, the Court claims that the 
physical presence rule creates an “unfair and unjust” tax loophole:  
The [physical presence rule] is unfair and unjust to those competitors, 
both local and out of State, who must remit the tax; to the consumers 
who pay the tax; and to the States that seek fair enforcement of the 
sales tax, a tax many States for many years have considered an 
indispensable source for raising revenue.75
The Court also goes on to say that “there is nothing unfair about 
requiring companies that avail themselves of the States’ benefits 
to bear an equal share of the burden of tax collection.”76
In other words, the physical presence rule harms two 
different groups of people. Since this rule makes it more difficult 
for states to collect sales taxes from out-of-state sellers with no 
physical presence in their state, it harms tax collectors in remote 
places like South Dakota. And it also harms business firms who 
do happen to have a physical presence in South Dakota, since 
they must collect and remit sales taxes on their in-state sales, 
while their competitors (the ones with no physical presence in 
South Dakota) do not. 
For my part, I do not dispute that the physical presence rule 
is unfair, since it creates serious harms and economic distortions.77
The problem with this argument, however, is that getting rid of 
the physical presence rule is also unfair and will likewise produce 
serious harms and distortions.78 In short, by overturning its 
pro-physical-presence precedents, the Court’s decision will harm 
consumers as well as out-of-state sellers, or in the words of Chief 
Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion: “[T]he marketplace itself 
could be affected by abandoning the physical-presence rule. The 
[majority’s] focus on unfairness and injustice does not appear to 
embrace consideration of that current public policy concern.”79
75 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096 (2018). 
76 Id.
77 See, e.g., Sarah Horn et al., Supreme Court Abandons Physical Presence 
Standard: An In-Depth Look at South Dakota v. Wayfair, THOMSON REUTERS (June 
22, 2018), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/news/supreme-court-abandons-physical-presence-
standard-an-in-depth-look-at-south-dakota-v-wayfair [http://perma.cc/47F8-NGZP] (“[T]he 
physical presence rule . . . has created unfair and unjust marketplace distortions favoring 
remote sellers and causing states to lose out on enormous amounts of tax revenue.”). 
78 See, e.g., Steven Malanga, Why Wayfair Isn’t Fair, C. J. (June 26, 2018), https://www.city-
journal.org/html/why-wayfair-isnt-fair-15990.html [http://perma.cc/HCW5-UKTA]. 
79 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2103 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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In short, the problem is not whether x rule or y loophole is 
unfair; the problem is figuring out which rule is less unfair. 
But there is an additional (and even more important) 
consideration at play in the Wayfair case: stare decisis. In other 
words, since the Supreme Court had already established the 
bright-line physical presence rule in previous cases, there is an 
additional harm we must take into consideration—the macro or 
system-wide harms to the rule of law and to the values of 
stability and predictability. The problem with this pro-stare 
decisis argument, however, is that these justifications for stare 
decisis are contested and open to debate. After all, if the 
correction of error and the use of reason should trump the past, 
why pretend that precedents matter? Why perpetuate the fiction 
of stare decisis? Wayfair thus poses a deeper puzzle: Where 
should the Justices draw the line between stability (the need to 
respect precedent) and change (the need to abandon flawed 
precedents or correct errors)? 
To sum up, stare decisis is an indeterminate doctrine. It will 
always be possible to find or manufacture a good reason for 
overturning a precedent case, and it will always be possible to 
rebut such a reason. But it takes a theory to beat a theory.80
I will thus present a brief and tentative sketch of a Bayesian 
theory of stare decisis below. In summary, instead of attempting 
to solve an intractable problem—the inherent tension between 
stability and change—my Bayesian approach brings stare decisis’ 
indeterminacy out in the open. 
III. SKETCH OF A POSSIBLE SOLUTION: BAYESIAN VOTING81
The ultimate problem with precedent is due less to the 
line-drawing challenges described above82 and more to the system 
of majority voting that courts like the U.S. Supreme Court use to 
decide cases. The problems with majority voting have been noted 
by others.83 In brief, majority voting system can be gamed via 
agenda setting and strategic voting.84 In the context of 
horizontal stare decisis, the problem with majority voting is 
80 For the origins of this oft-quoted maxim (“it takes a theory to beat a theory”), see 
Larry Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: It Takes a Theory to Beat a Theory, LEGAL THEORY 
BLOG (Oct. 21, 2012), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2012/10/introduction-it-takes-
a-theory-to-beat-a-theory-this-is-surely-one-of-the-top-ten-all-time-comments-uttered-by-
law-professo.html [http://perma.cc/QT2D-34YL].
81 For an explanation of Bayes’ theorem on which this model is based, see Joseph 
Berkson, Bayes’ Theorem, 1 ANNALS MATHEMATICAL STAT. 42 (1930). 
82 See Part II, supra.
83 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV.
802, 802 (1982). 
84 Id. at 817–23. 
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that each judge must emit a binary vote to either affirm the 
precedent case or overturn it. But in truth, the problem of 
precedent is a matter of degree. 
I thus propose a new approach to horizontal precedent: Bayesian 
stare decisis. That is, instead of asking judges to draw an 
impossible line between stability and change, why not ask them 
to use some alternative voting procedure, one that requires them 
to candidly disclose their subjective views regarding the strength 
of a contested precedent. Specifically, I would ask the Justices to 
consider adopting the following “Bayesian voting” procedure in 
which they would openly disclose their subjective evaluations of a 
precedent’s vitality by ranking its strength on some fixed scale, 
such as the [0, 1] interval.85
The type of Bayesian voting I am proposing here is often 
called “range voting” or “utilitarian voting” in the literature on 
voting systems.86 I shall call this alternative procedure “Bayesian 
voting,”87 or in the context of horizontal precedent, Bayesian
stare decisis. The virtue of this approach is that it candidly 
acknowledges the inherently subjective nature of the choice 
between stability and change. 
In summary, in cases in which the Supreme Court is 
considering whether to overturn one of its previous decisions, each 
Justice would assign a numerical score reflecting the strength of 
the precedent case. To be more precise, this score would reflect the 
Justice’s subjective belief in the precedent’s strength. To keep 
things simple, this degree of belief could be expressed in numerical 
terms anywhere in the range from 0 to 1, or 1 to 10, or some other 
uniform scale. The higher the score, the greater the Justice’s 
degree of belief in the strength of the precedent case. Let’s use 
the 0 to 1 scale to illustrate this idea. A score above 0.5 would 
indicate that the precedent is a strong one and should not be 
85 In theory, this Bayesian voting procedure could be applied to questions of 
precedential scope and to questions of precedential strength. That is, a judge could just as 
well use this Bayesian voting procedure to rank a precedent’s strength, i.e., whether a 
previous case should be overturned or not, or its scope, i.e., whether statement x is the 
holding or dicta. Here, however, I will limit my proposal to the question of strength, i.e., to 
cases in which the Court is considering overturning a precedent case. 
86 See generally Warren D. Smith, Range Voting (Nov. 28, 2000) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=8F0854766344036D6
E9D15E424CFA070?doi=10.1.1.32.9150&rep=rep1&type=pdf [http://perma.cc/4TEF-MK9F]; 
see also Claude Hillinger, The Case for Utilitarian Voting, 22 HOMO OECONOMICUS [ECON.
MAN] 295, 295 (2005). For a glossary of different voting procedures, see WILLIAM
POUNDSTONE, GAMING THE VOTE: WHY ELECTIONS AREN’T FAIR (AND WHAT WE CAN DO 
ABOUT IT) 287–89 (2008). 
87 See F. E. Guerra-Pujol, The Case for Bayesian Voting: A Response to Posner 
and Vermeule (Jan. 8, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3096881 [http://perma.cc/B3ZS-3337]. 
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overturned, while a score below 0.5 means that the precedent is 
weak and should be overturned. (A score of 0.5 would mean the 
judge is undecided about the precedent’s precedential strength.) 
Under this alternative system of Bayesian stare decisis, a 
precedent would be affirmed if the sum of the Justices’ individual 
scores divided by the number of Justices exceeded some threshold 
value, say 0.5 if the 0 to 1 scale were used. By contrast, a precedent 
would be overturned only if the sum of their individual scores 
divided by the number of Justices voting went below 0.5. (In the 
event the sum of the Justices’ individual scores divided by the 
number of Justices were exactly 0.5, the Court could require a 
rehearing of the case.) 
My Bayesian approach to precedent recognizes that the 
strength or scope of a precedent is always a matter of degree, not 
a binary or all-or-nothing question, or in the words of then-Judge 
Cardozo, “the duty of a judge [to follow precedent] becomes itself 
a question of degree . . . .”88
Of course, Bayesian stare decisis is open to a number of 
practical objections.89 Namely, why would the Justices themselves 
ever agree to implement such an unorthodox voting procedure? 
That said, my immediate purpose here is not to change the 
procedures of appellate practice and judging in the short term. My 
purpose is simply to question the traditional nature of judicial 
voting (majority rule) and demonstrate the subjective nature of 
stare decisis in close cases.90
Moreover, Bayesian voting is not so unorthodox. It is a 
voting procedure that is commonly used to aggregate collective 
preferences in many areas of daily life.91 For instance, “YouTube 
and Amazon allow users to rate videos and books on a five-point 
scale. The Internet Movie Database (IMDb) has ten-point ratings 
of movies.”92 If ordinary people are so accustomed to Bayesian 
voting in their everyday activities, such as rating movies and 
restaurants, then my proposed voting procedure should be simple 
and intuitive enough for the Justices of the Supreme Court. 
88 CARDOZO, supra note 24, at 161. 
89 See Guerra-Pujol, supra note 87, at 4. Due to a page-limit constraint, however, I 
will not rehearse these arguments in this Article. 
90 I have painted my alternative approach to precedent with a broad brush, since 
this symposium is about the Commerce Clause. Nevertheless, I delve into the details of 
Bayesian voting and the possibility of Bayesian verdicts in jury trials in my previous 
work. See id.; see also generally F. E. Guerra-Pujol, Why Don’t Juries Try Range Voting,
51 CRIM. L. BULL. 68 (2015). 
91 See POUNDSTONE, supra note 86, at 233. 
92 Id.; see also Claude Hillinger, Science and Ideology in Economic, Political 
and Social Thought (Nov. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), ssrn.com/abstract=945947 
[http://perma.cc/6HMN-QVJA]. 
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Before concluding, it is also worth noting that range voting 
works best when the same group of people rates all the candidates 
or products.93 Bayesian voting is thus an especially appropriate 
method for the Justices, since the same group of people (the 
Justices) would be rating the strength of a contested precedent. 
Lastly, in addition to its simplicity and user-friendly nature, 
Bayesian voting methods are difficult to game via strategic voting. 
By contrast, when the decisions of the Supreme Court are based on 
majority rule, stare decisis will remain open to strategic voting.94
But the chief virtue of my proposed method of Bayesian stare 
decisis is this: It candidly acknowledges the inherently indeterminate 
and subjective nature of the choice between stability and change. 
That is, given the indeterminate nature of precedent, why don’t we 
take an openly probabilistic view of precedent? As the Wayfair case 
itself shows, there is always some positive probability that a previous 
decision might be overturned, or in the words of the great jurist 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, “[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in 
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”95
IV. CONCLUSION
On a previous occasion, I explored the self-referential nature of 
stare decisis.96 When a court embraces the doctrine of stare decisis 
as an internal rule of procedure, the court’s acceptance of stare 
decisis becomes a precedent. Thus, the doctrine of stare decisis, like 
any other precedent, can itself be overturned. Nevertheless, it is 
highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will abandon this doctrine 
anytime soon. Like the power of judicial review97 or the landmark 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,98 the doctrine of stare 
decisis has been proclaimed on so many occasions that this doctrine 
operates as a super precedent, i.e., it has generated so much reliance 
93 See POUNDSTONE, supra note 86, at 233. 
94 See Michael L. Eber, When the Dissent Creates the Law: Cross-Cutting Majorities 
and the Prediction Model of Precedent, 58 EMORY L.J. 207, 207 (2008). 
95 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897). 
96 See generally F. E. Guerra-Pujol, Is Stare Decisis a Sand Castle?: An Open 
Letter to my Law Professor Colleagues , ARIZ. ST. L.J., (online ed. Oct. 1, 2012), 
http://arizonastatelawjournal.org/2012/10/01/is-stare-decisis-a-sand-castle-an-open-letter-
to-my-law-professor-colleagues/ [http://perma.cc/C68J-QFTZ]. Cf. KOZEL, supra note 27, at 
172 (“Should the Court give presumptive deference to its precedent about precedent, such 
that any revisions to the doctrine of stare decisis must be supported by a special 
justification above and beyond disagreement with the doctrine on the merits?”). A decision 
overturning stare decisis, however, would produce an even deeper puzzle: Would such a 
decision be binding in a future case? 
97 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
98 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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and has become so well accepted as to be “practically immune to 
reconsideration and reversal.”99
But that said, the development of new Internet applications 
and technologies—not only bitcoin but also sex robots, self-driving 
cars, and so forth—raises deep and difficult questions about the 
meaning of commerce and the wisdom of the Wayfair decision. 
Because these new technologies and applications are still evolving 
and their future impact unclear, it would be pure speculation on my 
part to predict how future courts will apply the Wayfair precedent 
to these new technologies and applications going forward. Instead, I 
have delved into a deeper problem in this Article—the intractable 
tension between stability and change—and I have provided a short 
sketch of a possible solution to this problem: Bayesian stare decisis
in place of simple majority voting. My approach has the virtue of 
making the subjective nature of stare decisis open and transparent. 
Yet, whatever theory of horizontal precedent one prefers, the central 
normative or prescriptive question remains the same: How 
constraining should stare decisis be? This question is all the more 
relevant in light of new Internet applications and technologies. 
99 Gerhardt, supra note 31, at 1206. 
